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THE STATUS OF NORMALIZED
DRAFTING: THE NEED FOR THEORY
BUILDING AND EMPIRICAL
VERIFICATIONO
By PETER ZIEGLER*
"Normalized legal drafting!' has been defined as "a mode of expressing
ideas in statutes, regulations, contracts, and other legal documents in such a way
that the syntax that relates the constituent propositions is simplified and
standardized."
Although many legal academics over a number of years have asserted that
there are many benefits to be obtained through use of the principles of normalized
drafting in the enactment of legislation, surprisingly only one formal empirical study
has been reported that indicates that the theory of normalized drafting may provide
for the effective enactment of legislative policy. This paper examines the subject
of normalized drafting from an empirical perspective and investigates the ability of
current research to contribute to scientific understanding of legislative drafting. A
framework to enable future research to achieve this goal is presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
The theory of normalized drafting as advocated by Allen,
Orechkoff, and Engholm appears capable of improving the quality
of the representation of the legislative intention as reflected in
enacted legislation.1  These academics have asserted that the
C
Copyright, 1989, Peter Ziegler.
* Peter Ziegler, Senior Manager, Taxation Services Division, Ernst & Whinney, Chartered
Accountants, Melbourne, Australia.
1 See for example, LE. Allen, "Symbolic Logic: A Razor-Edged Tool for Drafting and
Interpreting Legal Documents" (1957) 66 Yale LJ. 833; L.E. Allen & G. Orechkoff, 'Toward
a More Systematic Drafting and Interpreting of the Internal Revenue Code: Expenses, Losses,
and Bad Debts" (1957) 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1; and more recently, L.E. Allen & C.R. Engholm,
"Normalized Legal Drafting and the Query Method" (1978) 29 J. Leg. Ed. 380; and, C.R.
Engholm, "Logic and Laws: Relief from Statutory Obfuscation" (1976) 9 3. L. Ref. 332.
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normalized drafting approach provides a straight-forward and logical
means for the representation of legislation and regulations. Based
on this original research, further investigation and application has
indicated the apparent usefulness of the techniques in the
automation of the drafting process, and in the development of
intelligent systems for the law.2
Although conceptual developments in this field have arisen,3
only one academic journal has empirically verified the technique
involved.4 This lack of empirical verification implies that researchers
will be unable to ascertain whether the theory of normalized drafting
can explain or predict with respect to its subject matter of
application. Therefore, the usefulness of a normalized drafting
approach must be open to doubt.5 In fact, several researchers have
questioned the basis and applicability of normalized drafting
techniques. For example, as long ago as 1972, Boyd, in an in-depth
article investigating the integration of computers and law, claimed
that there were "difficulties and disadvantages associated with the
approach.'6
2 See for example, a series of three articles by C.G. de Bessonet, "A Proposal for
Developing the Structural Science of Codification" (1980) 8 Rutgers Computer & Tech. LJ.
47; "An Automated Approach to Scientific Codification" (1982) 9 Rutgers Computer & Tech.
LJ. 27; and "An Automated Intelligent System Based on a Model of a Legal System" (1984)
10 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L. J. 31. See also, Edwards & Barber, "A Computer Method
for Legal Drafting Using Propositional Logic' (1975) 53 Tex. L. Rev. 965.
3 See the research of C.G. de Bessonet, ibid., for his extensions of Allen's normalized
drafting techniques to include semantic processing of conditions, together with a refinement
of normalized drafting techniques for the syntactic representation of legal rules.
4 L.E. Allen & C.R. Engholm, "The Need for Clear Structure in 'Plain Language' Legal
Drafting" (1980) 13 J. L. Reform 455.
5 The motivation, and underlying basis, for this paper arose out of an article by Vessey
& Weber, "Research on Structured Programming: An Empiricist's Evaluation" (1984) IEEE
Trans. Software Eng. 397. These researchers observed that while there is significant academic
and practitioner support for a theory of structured programming within the discipline of
computer science (which, at a higher level of abstraction, can be considered analogous to the
techniques of normalized drafting within legislation), there has been a lack of detailed theory
development, and few empirical studies have been undertaken that unequivocally support the
usefulness of the approach.
6 W.E. Boyd, "Law in Computers and Computers in Law: A Lawyers View of the State
of the Art" (1972) 14 Ariz. L. Rev. 267. The author claims at 278-79:
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As Robson implies when analyzing drafting deficiencies within
legislation, the subject of legislative drafting must be considered as
an empirical science. 7  Consequently, for any normative theory of
legislative drafting to be of benefit it must enable cost-effective
improvements in the practice of legislative drafting. Ultimately, if
the theory of normalized drafting and its various extensions does not
provide for such cost-effective improvements in legislative practice
it should be discarded and other avenues for improvement
investigated!
In this paper the theory of normalized drafting (as defined
originally by Allen9 and subsequently extended and articulated by
other researchers) is examined from an empirical viewpoint. The
paper attempts to demonstrate that the normalized drafting approach
to legislation is in need of empirical verification. The objective is to
determine the type of problems that are faced by empirical
success depends on the willingness of members of the legal profession to learn and
use the language of symbolic logic. Given the notorious reluctance of lawyers to
assimilate new techniques, the prospects of getting them to learn a new language
would appear dim at best. Apart from this important practical difficulty, it is not
clear that the law can or ought to be reduced to precisely stated implicative-normal
form rules which assume there is only one correct statement of and answer to a
particular question.... Whatever legal "rules" are ... it is not apparent that they can
be stated in "normal" form without distorting their meaning, concept and content.
See Robson, "Legislative Draftsmanship" (1946) 17 Pol. Q. 330 at 342. Some
researchers may dispute this assertion. See for example, Bennion (formerly one of the
Parliamentary Counsel in Great Britain), "A Computer Experiment in Legislative Drafting"
(1975) 6 Computers & Law 8 at 8 who implies that legislative drafting is an "art form" based
on experience and heuristics rather than a scientific or theoretical basis.
8 It is acknowledged that it may still be premature to evaluate the usefulness of the
technique in the light of current research being conducted by researchers into the
computerization of the legislative drafting process based on normalized drafting techniques.
See for example, C.G. de Bessonet (1984), supra, note 2; J.A. Sprowl, "Automating the Legal
Reasoning Process: A Computer That Uses Regulations and Statutes to Draft Legal
Documents" [1979] A.B.F.RJ. 1; C.G. de Bessonet, "Automated Retrieval of Information:
Toward the Development of a Formal Language for Expressing Statutes" (1979) 6 So. U. L.
Rev. 1; J.P. Finan, "LAWGICAL: Jurisprudential and Logical Considerations" (1982) 15
Akron L. Rev. 675; J.T. Welch, "LAWGICAL: An Approach to Computer-Aided Legal
Analysis" (1982) 15 Akron L. Rev. 655. Research currently being performed may lead to
cost-effective improvements in legislative drafting practice as either a direct or indirect result
of the investigations undertaken.
9 See L.E. Allen, supra, note 1.
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researchers in their investigation of normalized drafting techniques,
indicate why these problems have arisen, and suggest how they might
be remedied, at least in part.
The paper is presented as follows. Section II briefly outlines
the theory of normalized drafting and its extensions, and evaluates
its ability to provide clearly defined hypotheses with respect to the
impact of normalized drafting on the syntactic and semantic
representation of the legislative intention. Section III considers
the type of hypotheses that have been frequently proposed. In
particular, their ability to contribute toward understanding or
prediction with respect to the drafting task is examined. Section IV
then discusses the kinds of empirical investigation that will facilitate
the achievement of this aim, together with certain problems that are
likely to be encountered in the performance of any empirical
research undertaken. Finally, Section V provides a brief summary
of the major conclusions of the paper.
II. THE THEORY OF NORMALIZED DRAFTING
In order to consider empirical verification of normalized
drafting theory it is first necessary to have an understanding of the
nature of the theory - only through this understanding can major
hypotheses be generated and meaningfully evaluated. That is,
without detailed knowledge of the theory of normalized drafting it
is impossible to either develop understanding or make predictions
with respect to the legislative drafting task.
To date, normalized drafting theory has followed two major
directions. The first direction, which is identified for convenience as
the "syntactics stream," has provided the basis for the second
research direction which is identified below as the "extensions
stream." The syntactics stream is typified by the work of Allen,
Engholm and Orechkoff, and more recently, Edwards and Barber.10
Normalized drafting, in this original form, can generally be defined
1 0 Supra, notes 1 and 2.
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as the use of symbolic logic11 to draft and analyze the syntax of legal
statements. Professor Layman Allen first explored the use of this
technique in 1957 to identify ambiguities, inconsistencies, and
redundancies within legal documents.12  He found a close
relationship between the connecting words and phrases such as "and,"
"or," "not," "unless," and "provided that," commonly found within
statutes, and other legal documents, and the logical operators of
symbolic logic. He asserted that use of "unless" and "provided that"
lead to unnecessary syntactic ambiguity between sentences, and to a
lesser extent, within sentences. Professor Allen claims that the
logical operators, "and," "or," "not," "if ... then ...," and "if and only
if ... then ..." can be used to reduce this syntactic ambiguity.
The syntactics stream, therefore, aims to establish, for
example, that any statute can be drafted using specific rule
formulations,13  or that a statute written based on these rule
formulations can be demonstrated to be syntactically consistent.14
While these researchers implicitly hypothesize with respect to the
impact of normalized drafting on the representation of the legislative
intention, they do not appear to have explicitly defined these
hypotheses as principles of interaction connecting use of normalized
drafting techniques with bench marks that can be used to evaluate
the legislative form enacted. Therefore, from an empirical
perspective, their research does not enable experiments to be
performed that examine the impact of normalized drafting on the
cost-effective representation of the legislative intention in an
enactment.
The extensions stream, on the other hand, endeavours, to a
limited extent, to demonstrate how the application of normalized
11 A concise and clearly presented treatment of symbolic logic can be found in N.
Rescher, Introduction to Logic (New York: St Martin's Press, 1964). For a more advanced
treatment of the topic, see R.B. Angell, Reasoning and Logic (New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts, 1964).
12 See L.E. Allen, supra, note 1.
13 The predominant rule formulation is the "if-then-else" form rather than a general rule
followed by exceptions, exceptions to exceptions, and cross-references to other rules.
14 See for example, L.E. Allen, "Analysis of Law by Symbolic Logic," in R.P. Bigelow,
ed., Computers and the Law (Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, 1969) 167 at 167-68; and
P.B. Maggs & C.G. de Bessonet, "Automated Logical Analysis of Systems of Legal Rules"
(1972) 12 Jurimetrics J. 158.
1989]
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drafting techniques, as currently articulated, potentially impacts both
the syntactic and semantic representation of the legislative
intention.15 The extensions stream has, therefore, extended the
research of the syntactics stream and thereby adopted a more
systematic and comprehensive approach to the representation of
legislation. However, to this point, insignificant headway has been
achieved from the original extensions made to normalized drafting
theory some six years ago.16
Care must be taken to distinguish between the many
assertions pertaining to the impact of normalized drafting
(irrespective of whether research is defined within either of the
above two streams) on the drafting of legislation, and models that
accurately express associations among the factors considered relevant.
Without doubt, a perusal of academic journals indicates that there
are no fully developed models which, for example, account for why,
for a normalized and a non-normalized enactment containing the
same decision rules, "[s]tudents using normalized versions of the
statutes answered questions about 20 percent faster and about 30
percent more accurately than they did using the original text of the
statutes."17 However, the foundations for this type of model have
existed for a number of years. As indicated above, the underlying
basis for normalized drafting techniques, the if-then-else statement,
is in the discipline of symbolic logic. Originally, the techniques of
symbolic logic were applied in the field of mathematics.18 They were
then applied and developed in the context of psychological
15 See for example, C.G. de Bessonet, supra, note 2.
16 C.G. de Bessonet, "A Proposal for Developing the Structural Science of Codification,"
supra, note 2, appears to be the first researcher who considered both the syntactic and
semantic representation of legislation using normalized techniques. Subsequent research has
more fully articulated these ideas and related the underlying concepts to the production of
statutory texts that are capable of being processed intelligently by computers.
17 L.E. Allen & C.R. Engholm, supra, note 1 at 396 where the authors use normalized
and non-normalized sections of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code. Allen and Engholm in their
later 1980 study, supra, note 4 at 470, observe, in the context of what has become known as
the New York Plain Language statute, that even greater differences in accuracy may be
achieved (up to 80%) although with no differences in time taken.
18 See for example, Post, "Formal Reduction of the General Combinatorial Problem"
(1943) 65 Am. J. of Math. 197.
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research1 9 and in the area of complexity theory20 in the 1950s and
1960s. More recently, a close derivative of the underlying theory has
been applied in the field of computer software design and
representation.21 Research from this latter area has indicated that
the if-then statement form in software programmes enables
programmers to better understand the logic of program code.22
There is a significant difference, however, between the
development of casual hypotheses derived from symbolic logic and
the various contexts in which it has been applied, and models
seeking to explicitly articulate the relationship or association between
normalized drafting and some quality characteristics for the
representation of legislation. Unquestionably, in-depth research
needs to be undertaken in this regard. Thornton, for example,
identifies two major bases by which the quality of legislation can be
assessed: simplicity and precision.23 Simplicity is said to have the
principal qualities of (a) economy; (b) directness; (c) familiarity of
language; and (d) orderliness, while precision needs to be considered
in terms of (a) choice of words; and (b) sentence structure.24  A
theory must be developed that associates those symbolic logic
concepts considered relevant with the quality characteristics
presented above.25  There are two aspects to this theory
19 See for example, A. Newell & H.A. Simon, Human Problem Solving (Englewood Cliffs,
NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1972).
20 See H.A. Simon, 'The Architecture of Complexity' (1962) 106 Proc. Am. Phil. Soc.
467; and J.G. Miller, Living Systems (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978).
21 See for example, GJ. Myers, Reliable Software Through Composite Design (New York:
Petrocelli-Charter, 1975); and E. Yourdon & L.L. Constantine, Structured Design:
Fundamentals of a Discipline of Computer Program and Systems Design (Englewood Cliffs,
NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1979).
22 See Tracz, "Computer Programming and the Human Thought Process" (1979) 9
Software - Practice and Experience 127; and Frost, "Psychology and Program Design" (1975)
21 Datamation 137.
23 G.C. Thornton, Legislative Drafting, 2d ed. (London: Butterworth & Co., 1981).
24 ibid. at 49-55.
25 Of course, other quality characteristics for the, representation of legislation (or other
legal documents) can be identified which are equally as valid as those presented in the text.
For example, Melville, The Draftsman's Handbook (London: Oyez Longman Publishing
Limited, 1985) identifies (at 17) three characteristics; viz., clarity, conciseness, and
comprehensibility. Readers' preferences for various quality characteristics, however, should
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development. First, as an initial step, the nature of the relationships
involved must be identified. Secondly, each suggested relationship
must be empirically verified. Based on a perusal of academic
journals, it can be observed that neither aspect has been sufficiently
addressed, with the result that the detailed development of a theory
of normalized drafting has not been forthcoming. This conclusion
is reinforced by the following examination with respect to normalized
drafting hypotheses.
III. NORMALIZED DRAFTING HYPOTHESES
Following on from the above empirical analysis of normalized
drafting theory, it must be expected (given the direct relationship
between hypotheses and the theories from which they emanate) that
detailed, carefully constructed hypotheses generated from normalized
drafting principles will not have been developed and evaluated.
However, it is considered fruitful to examine the nature of these
hypotheses as they enable further understanding of the difficulties
involved in developing, and empirical verification of, normalized
drafting theory.26
Pursuing an empirical perspective, the benefit of a theory can
only be evaluated by testing hypotheses generated from that theory.
Dubin, in his classical text Theoy Building, suggests that theories of
social and human behaviour address themselves to two distinct
objectives, either prediction or understanding, and that in the usual
course of events these objectives are not often achieved together as
each objective may be attained without reference to the other.27 In
terms of the objective of prediction, Dubin suggests that researchers
can either "foretell the value of one or more units making up a
system; or ... anticipate the condition or state of a system as a
not affect the tenor of the arguments presented.
26 In terms of theory development, it appears that little real progress has been achieved
if a comparison is made between J.A. Meldman's 1977 research, "A Structural Model for
Computer-Aided Legal Analysis" (1977) 6 Rutgers J. Computers & L. 27 and the most recent
research in the area, C.G. de Bessonet, "An Automated Intelligent System Based on a Model
of a Legal System," supra, note 2.
27 R. Dubin, Theory Building, rev'd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1969) at 18-19.
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whole." On the other hand, he defines the goal of understanding as
being "knowledge about the interaction of units in a system."28
Dubin describes the prediction/understanding paradox in the
following terms:
The disjunction between power of understanding and precision in prediction rests
essentially on three factors.
(1) The development of a model as a system for comprehending a limited realm of
knowledge is necessarily bounded, and hence excludes realms of phenomena. This
may have the effect of excluding crucial variables that contribute significantly to
an outcome [prediction] but not to an understanding of the operation of the
particular system being analyzed.
(2) A model may be a deliberate oversimplification of a range of phenomena that
makes for better understanding of the simplified realm but cannot directly generate
precise predictions.
(3) The model for understanding may focus on broad relationships among the
variables composing it and consequently emphasize such a feature as directionality
of relationship, which is not of itself sufficient to determine precision in
prediction.
2 9
Hence, given that a theory of normalized drafting must be firmly
rooted within the fields of social or human behaviour, hypothesis
testing should seek to either explain the interaction between
variables that comprise the theory, or make predictions with respect
to those variables. At present researchers appear to adopt neither
approach.
Viewed from another perspective, as the learned
methodologist Blalock observes in Theory Construction, it is necessary
to develop theories that, on the one hand, are not so abstract or
general that they cannot be adequately tested (leading to problems
in identification, definition, and measurement of variables), nor, on
the other hand, so simple as to be totally inadequate to mirror the
real world (trite).3 ° Blalock suggests there is a need for "middle
range" theories that provide testable hypotheses that instantiate a
more general theory3
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid. at 26-27.
30 H.M. Blalock, Theory Construction: From Verbal to Mathematical Formulations
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1969) at 3-5.
31 Ibid. at 141. Blalock terms these middle range theories "auxiliary theories."
1989]
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Apart from the need for a theory of normalized drafting to
generate testable hypotheses that contribute to an understanding
and/or prediction of the drafting task, there is an additional
requirement from an economic perspective for hypothesis testing to
be performed in a cost-effective manner. That is, only strategic or
critical hypotheses should be evaluated to minimize the effort and
expense involved in empirical experiments designed to validate the
theory.
As Dubin notes:
In choosing the propositions of a model for empirical testing, it is desirable in tile
interests of parsimony to select strategic propositions.... The strategic proposition
points out where something notable is happening to the values of one or more units
[in a theory]. Such notable values readily command attention because they are
distinguished from the mundane surrounding values. Therefore, insofar as the
theorist-researcher can distinguish strategic from trivial propositions, he is armed
with a useful means for zeroing his research attention on critical tests of the model.
Whether or not a model will be corroborated or need modification after making the
empirical test is more easily determined if strategic propositions have been tested.
3 2
Recall that in the previous section it was stressed that many
possible relationships are able to be identified within a theory of
normalized drafting. As a result many testable propositions may be
generated from the theory. Furthermore, each proposition identified
may need to be empirically investigated utilizing the numerous
metrics that exist for the variables of interest. By way of example,
Thornton identified six metrics for the two quality characteristics
(simplicity and precision) identified. Obviously, it is critical to first
test the strategic hypotheses involved if parsimony is to be attained.
It is submitted that normalized drafting theory as currently developed
and articulated does not enable understanding of the underlying
processes involved in the effective representation of legislation, nor
does it assist in the selection of strategic hypotheses to be evaluated.
In general, proponents of the theory have sought predictive power,
although they have not been particularly successful in this regard
either3 3 Researchers have sought to apply the techniques derived
32 R. Dubin, supra, note 27 at 169.
33 Following on from the prediction/explanation argument in the text, it would be
interesting to examine the numerous claims made for the advantages of normalized drafting
and analyze them from this perspective. From an investigation of the academic literature
available to the author, it appears that claims with respect to prediction, rather than
[VOL 27 No. 2
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from normalized drafting theory instead of, as a first step,
determining the soundness of its foundation in the legal drafting
context. 34
In support of the author's arguments, consider first Table 1.
TABLE 1
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH LEVELS OF ABSTRACTION
Notes: 1. Legislation will have defects if the sociolegal environment has changed
since the enactment of the legislation.
2. Design errors will occur where the structure of the rules within legislation
is ambiguous, i.e. syntactic ambiguity.
3. Coding errors will occur where the representation of legislative rules is
ambiguous, i.e., semantic ambiguity.
understanding, are made. See for example, C.G. de Bessonet, "An Automated Approach to
Scientific Codification," supra, note 2, where the author claims that a structural model of a
civilian code emerges as a product of attempts to idealize the manner in which code
information is communicated. Perhaps this emphasis on prediction indicates that
academics/drafters who are primarily interested in results or outcomes dominate the journal
literature rather than legal scientists who presumably are more interested in understanding.
34 Within the Kuhnian thesis of scientific development, many researchers are now
undertaking "normal science" within a supposed paradigm of normalized drafting. See further,
T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1970) especially at 23-42.
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The rows depict the major phases within the legislation development
life cycle; the columns depict the various legislative activities that can
be undertaken.35 Further dimensions to the matrix could be added
in a more detailed analysis. For example, dimensions to represent
the complexity of legislation or the manner in which the legislative
process is organized or structured. The shaded area in Table 1
represents the part of the legislation development life cycle where
normalized drafting techniques could be expected to have an impact.
Consider, now, two levels of abstraction. At a high level of
abstraction, assume the legal researcher is trying to articulate theory
and generate hypotheses associating use of normalized drafting
techniques and various quality attributes of new enactments. For
example, the quality attributes and associated metrics described by
Thornton may be used.36 Thus, a legal researcher would investigate
the relationships between normalized drafting and economy,
normalized drafting and directness, normalized drafting and
familiarity of language, etc., and then propose hypotheses based on
the model. Using this approach, the focus will be on the shaded
part of the first column within Table 1.
From another perspective a legal researcher may seek to
develop theoretical models for a particular step within an activity -
a cell of the matrix. Once again, at this lower level of abstraction,
an attempt would need to be made to identify the various criterion
variables of interest and to articulate the relationship between
normalized drafting and these variables. For example, for the
syntactic representation step in the development of new legislation,
an attempt can be made to model the impact of normalized drafting
on the understandability of the structure of legislative code.
While research at the column level may add to our predictive
powers, it is submitted that, at this time, research at the cell level
must be undertaken if legal researchers are to increase their
understanding of the impact of normalized drafting and their
See further, P. Ziegler, Evaluation of the Legislative Process: A Controls Approach
(Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Queensland, Australia, 1986).
3 6 Supra, note 23.
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aptitude to distinguish the strategic hypotheses involved.37  As it is
not possible to prove this argument an effort is made to illustrate
the point by way of hypothetical example. Suppose several
replications of an experiment indicate the following outcome: if
normalized drafting techniques are utilized in the enactment of a
new statute, the total number of labour hours expended by the
legislative drafters will be less than the number expended to develop
a statute of equivalent quality38 when normalized drafting techniques
are not implemented.3 9 Legal researchers would then seek to
determine the reason for these results being obtained. To find the
solution to this problem, researchers need to identify the laws of
interaction or principles of association between normalized drafting
and labour hours needed to draft a new statute. Obviously, some
complex interactions are potentially involved. A legal researcher
may expect that there is a decrease in the time required to produce
the syntactic representation of legal rules when normalized drafting
techniques are utilized, but may be uncertain that a decreased time
period will be required for the semantic representation of those legal
rules. It may be that normalized drafting techniques are associated
with both increases and decreases in labour hours expended on the
drafting phases within the legislative process. If this is correct, use
of normalized drafting techniques will not always imply a decrease
in the amount of time for the development of legislation. For
example, for simple enactments it is possible that use of normalized
drafting techniques will be correlated with an increased time
It is not denied that theories can be pathbreaking with respect to their general
applicability rather than specificity. However, these theories appear to emanate from an
advanced body of restricted theories and empirical findings.
38 It is acknowledged that it is difficult to obtain objective criteria in order to ascertain
the quality of legislative enactments. To date, use of readability measures, such as the Flesch
Readability Test (Flesch, How to Test Readability (New York: Harper and Bros., 1951)) or
the Gunning Fog Readability Test (R. Gunning, The Technique of Clear Writing (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1968)) have been considered useful in providing objective, as distinct to
subjective, criteria. As to the usefulness of the Flesch Readability Test in the evaluation of
the readability of legislation, see Conrad, "A Legislative Text: New Ways to Write Laws"
(1946-47) 56 Yale L. J. 458.
39 To date, the author is unaware of any published research that has addressed this
question. This finding is considered surprising given that legislative drafters and supporters
of normalized drafting techniques are presumably interested in the identification of cost-
effective changes in the practice of legislative drafting.
1989]
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requirement for the development of legislation while the converse
may apply for more complex legislation.
When seeking to solve problems of this type, legal
researchers must follow a process of disaggregation utilizing variables
at a lower level of abstraction.40 This disaggregation process should
stop when a legal researcher is certain as to the validity of the
axioms forming the basis for the general theory and the derived
relationships under consideration. 41
By way of illustration, consider again the previous
hypothetical example. To explain why deceased labour hours
expended by the drafters on the development of new legislation are
associated with the use of normalized drafting techniques, legal
researchers may form the following propositions:
1. Syntactic and semantic representation are two phases that comprise
the development task for new legislation (axiom).
2. Decreased labour hours expended on syntactic representation are
associated with the use of normalized drafting techniques (axiom).
3. Decreased labour hours involved in semantic representation are
associated with the use of normalized drafting techniques (axiom).
4. Decreased labour hours expended on the development of new
legislation are associated with the use of normalized drafting techniques (derivation).
Obviously, if the axioms are correct then the derivation must
be also correct. 42 On the other hand, if the axioms of the theory
turn out to be incorrect based on empirical verification of the
derivation, the legal researcher will need to continue the
disaggregation process by identifying new axioms formulated in terms
of variables expressed at a lower level of abstraction.
It would appear that the arguments made in support of
normalized drafting are not logical derivatives of a carefully
constructed theory. No set of axioms and derivations can be
40 See generally, M.D. Mesarovic, D. Macko & Y. Takahara, Theory of Hierarchical,
Multilevel Systems (New York: Academic Press, 1970).
41 When the axioms of a theory are articulated, the derivations must follow as a logical
consequence. If the derivations prove incorrect, assuming the system of logic has been applied
correctly, then the axioms must be also incorrect.
42 H.M. Blalock, supra, note 30, argues that an axiom in the empirical sciences (a
category to which the subject of legal drafting aspires) should be considered separately from
an axiom in mathematics. In this latter field an axiom is a truth statement taken for granted.
In the empirical sciences it is only an assumption that is almost universally accepted.
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identified, with the result that it is impossible to evaluate the axioms
on which the claims rest. Furthermore, the claims appear to be
made at a fairly high level of abstraction. Thus, even if the
theoretical model utilized as the basis for the claims can be
determined, in light of the foregoing arguments, the axioms used in
the model may be disputed.
By way of further example of these problems, consider the
claim made by Allen and Engholm that normalized drafting methods
result in statutes that are easier to understand. 43 From an empirical
research perspective, this argument is in need of further articulation.
Fortunately, Allen and Engholm do indicate two criterion variables
they have in mind.44 They assert that normalized drafting methods
enable statutes to be read faster45 and more accurately than
corresponding statutes that are non-normalized.
First, consider the issue of the speed of reading statutes.
From an empirical viewpoint, it is uncertain what is meant by speed
of reading unless there is a benchmark to provide a standard for
reference. Reading speed must be related to a measure or measures
of understanding, otherwise the resulting statistic will not be
interpretable in any meaningful fashion.
Further, it is uncertain whether Allen and Engholm are
concerned with understanding pertaining to the enactment of new
legislation (a single column in Table 1) or with respect to all types
of legislative activity (four columns in Table 1). If their emphasis is
on a single column, it appears possible to identify a theoretical
model based on relationships among reading speed, the major
precept of normalized drafting - syntactic representation, and
understanding of legislation. On the other hand, if their focus is
with respect to all four columns of Table 1 (a higher level of
abstraction), the validity of any relationship identified within the
context of theory appears open to question. For example, it is
unclear whether the cognitive processes needed to comprehend the
43 L.E. Allen & C.R. Engholm, supra, note 1 at 380.
44 Ibid. at 396.
45 This finding was not obtained in their later 1980 study, supra, note 4. Allen and
Engholm found that "lawyers, law students and lay persons ... work about 80% more accurately
when the statute is expressed in normalized form ... with no significant change in the time
taken to analyze and answer the questions." Ibid. at 470.
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meaning of a statute are the same for new legislative enactments and
for legislative amendments to correct defects found within an
enactment. If these processes are not the same, it is arguable
whether normalized drafting techniques facilitate both types of
understanding required.
Next, the issue of accuracy in understanding a statute can be
considered. This criterion variable (as was the first criterion
variable) is a quality characteristic of the final product of the
legislative process (the legislation enacted) rather than the result of
each phase of that process. Once again, it is uncertain whether the
focus is with respect to the enactment of new legislation (a single
column of Table 1), or all types of legislative activities (four columns
of Table 1). Given the proposition, it is a difficult problem to
determine the underlying theoretical model. Nevertheless, assuming
that empirical evidence indicates that the proposition has predictive
power, the researcher will be unable to understand why the
relationship exists. In order to gain this understanding, legal
researchers must disaggregate the process and analyze the impact
of normalized drafting on the basis of this "accuracy" variable
(howsoever defined) during each phase of the legislative process.46
The intent is not to ridicule Allen and Engholm's claim in
the above analysis. As has frequently been recognized, theory
development in an area usually necessitates the dedicated efforts of
many researchers. The above simple analysis suggests, by example,
that the benefits claimed for normalized drafting techniques are not
clearly articulated. The major reason for this problem appears to be
the lack of an in-depth, comprehensive theory for the generation of
hypotheses, coupled with research performed at a high level of
abstraction which does not enable understanding to be achieved. As
a result of these two reasons, empirical researchers must find it
extremely difficult to perform empirical experiments that enable
understanding of the impact of normalized drafting on the legislative
process. Moreover, as strategic hypotheses cannot be isolated,
empirical research cannot proceed in a parsimonious fashion.
46 For a good example of this tendency, see C.G. de Bessonet, "An Automated Approach
to Scientific Codification," supra, note 2, where this researcher refers back to the underlying
conceptual schemata that form the basis for the representation of the legislative intention.
Such underlying schema can be viewed as "part and parcel" of the analysis and design phase
of the legislative process in Table 1.
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IV. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
As indicated throughout this paper in Sections II and III,
empirical research is needed to investigate the effects of normalized
drafting techniques on the representation of the legislative intention.
It is submitted that this research should proceed in terms of the
approach identified in the previous two sections on theory and
hypotheses; namely, that the hypotheses tested should be a reflection
of the underlying theory, and that the level of abstraction chosen
must enable understanding or prediction to result. Therefore,
careful controls will have to be exercised over any empirical research
undertaken so that only a few factors are allowed to vary, at least
in the initial stages of the research.47 It should be noted at the
outset that the conclusions drawn on the status of normalized
drafting theory and hypotheses do not augur well for the success of
empirical studies that may be undertaken. Nevertheless, it is hoped
that the following guidelines and suggestions will enable some
progress to be achieved.
A. Laboratory Studies, Field Studies and Surveys
Laboratory studies provide the easiest, most straightforward
means for the collection of empirical data with respect to legislative
drafting.48  The analysis and design, syntactic, and semantic
representation phases in Table 1 can be investigated on the basis of
certain quality attributes of legislation that may be identified.
Different subject matters dealt with by legislation can be examined,
As indicated previously in the text, tightly controlled experiments give rise to the
question of their practical significance. Ultimately, some type of effect can be produced if
enough factors are controlled. It is trite learning to point out that the relative importance of
those factors that are controlled versus those that are varied in an issue of real world
significance.
48 See further, LE. Allen & C.R. Engholm, supra, note 4, where the authors used a
laboratory study to conduct their investigation.
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and different respondent groups can be used.49 Furthermore, the
impact of normalized drafting techniques on different drafting styles
(for example, common law compared with continental drafting
styles) can be investigated. 50 Depending on the level of abstraction
pursued, the results obtained can contribute to either prediction or
understanding of the drafting process.
Field studies or surveys, on the other hand, by their very
nature, can be undertaken at a fairly high level of aggregation, and
are better suited to gathering information enabling prediction rather
than understanding. The need for a clearly articulated theory
becomes all the more important if these research techniques are
utilized in order to enable a logical interpretation to be made as to
the information collected. Without this theory the empiricist tests
vague hypotheses, is uncertain about the variables of interest, is
unclear how variables should be defined, measured and controlled,
and has little indication of the strategic hypotheses to test. Further,
she will be unable to determine whether further empirical research
should be undertaken, whether methodological problems in the study
have influenced the results, and whether appropriate questions have
been asked. This problem is particularly important with surveys as
there are fewer opportunities to obtain understanding in that
chances for follow up are more constrained than for field studies.
Therefore, questions on survey materials should be specifically
directed towards understanding as to why an effect occurs, otherwise
surveys can give only a global picture.
Taking into account that there may be difficulties in
comparing surveys or field studies based on different respondent
populations, using different response scales and the like, some
common findings pertaining to the advantages and disadvantages of
different drafting techniques should be obtained. As stated
previously, it is important to emphasize that the research problem
49 L.E. Allen & C.R. Engholm, supra, note 1, report that a series of experiments were
conducted by Professor Allen over a period of nine years at the University of Michigan Law
School using groups of second and third year students who were given problems designed to
measure comprehension of various sections of the Internal Revenue Code in terms of syntactic
representation. It will be remembered that in their later study in 1980, supra, note 4, Allen
and Engholm used three types of subjects: lay persons, law students, and lawyers.
50 This type of examination would, therefore, be concerned with at least both syntactic
and semantic representation in terms of the phases (rows) identified in Table 1.
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should be aimed at an appropriate level of aggregation if meaningful
insights are to result.
Finally, one further issue must be discussed that is considered
to be of major importance to any empirical research to be
performed. It is unclear whether the complexity of legislative
drafting skill prevents successful empirical research using a classic
experimental approach. It is arguable that legislative drafters
frequently use substantially different approaches to solving drafting
problems depending on their level of skill, such that manipulating,
say, a single factor is unlikely to explain much of the variance in task
performance. Thus, it is these differences in approach that need to
be controlled, rather than the subject of normalized drafting itself.
Legislative drafting is a process of applying knowledge
structures (domains) to a legislative proposal that ultimately results
in the language of the legislation enacted. A "knowledge structure"
can primarily be considered as a general solution method able to be
employed to solve a problem. From a Kuhnian perspective, a
knowledge structure (in this context) can be viewed as a "paradigm"
of legislative drafting. To date, there appear to be no well-
articulated paradigms for the field of legislative drafting.
Undoubtedly, legislative drafters have conceptual schemata within
which they view any legislative problem, however, the clear
exposition of these schemata has not been undertaken. An expert
drafters will have a greater understanding of the techniques involved,
and will regard specific pieces of legislation to be drafted as being
particular examples that can be solved using the general solution
method. On the other hand, an inexperienced (novice) drafters may
confront the same requirements for legislation and be unable to
solve the problem. Newell and Simon distinguish experts from
novices in the elaborateness of the knowledge structures possessed
by the problem solver 5l It is widely recognized that legislative
drafting is a highly skilled activity. It is contended that no matter
how legislative drafters' knowledge bases are structured, their
existence and size appears evident. When a high level of skill is
required to fulfill a particular legislative instruction, these differences
in knowledge structures are likely to account for a large proportion
of the variance in performance among legislative drafters.
A. Newell & H.A. Simon, supra, note 19.
1989]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Therefore, as legislative drafters possess greatly different skills
(differences in knowledge structures), any hypotheses which predict
differences in either individual aptitude or task complexity will be
extremely difficult to investigate.
Consider, again, the nature of the phases in the legislative
process that involve the services of legislative drafters: the analysis
and design, syntactic, and semantic representation phases. Without
doubt, in order to perform these phases high level skills that have
been acquired through experience, rather than by formal instruction,
are necessary. Therefore, if researchers seek to ascertain whether
modification in some legislative drafting technique has a beneficial
impact on the performance of legislative drafting, they must ensure
that subjects in their experiments employ the same knowledge
structure(s) when undertaking the drafting task. Otherwise, it is
impossible to determine whether changes observed in the level of
performance are the result of modification to the drafting techniques
employed. The underlying problem the researcher is attempting to
solve is the extent to which a given drafting technique implements
a particular legislative drafting paradigm (howsoever defined). It is
submitted that the achievement of scientific progress in legislative
drafting necessitates development and dissemination of drafting
techniques which instantiate the major paradigms held by legislative
drafters. In order for this to occur, these drafting paradigms should
be articulated so that drafting techniques can be designed consistent
with them. In this manner the paradigm can be controlled so that
the features of different drafting techniques can be studied
systematically in any empirical research undertaken.
The problem for the empiricist legal researcher then becomes
to ascertain whether their subject drafters have homogenous
knowledge structures when they undertake a particular legislative
drafting experiment. Perhaps the easiest approach for performing
this task is through the use of protocol analysis52 - which, in this
context, involves having subjects talk aloud when performing a
drafting task and then examining their "protocols" to determine those
features that are identical and those which are different. Although
it is acknowledged that protocol analysis does not provide the
52 See further, A. Newell & H.A. Simon, supra, note 19.
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complete solution to this problem, 3 it does provide some very useful
insights in this regard.
Finally, in light of the methodological difficulties described
above, it is necessary to consider the nature of normalized drafting.
It is open to debate whether normalized drafting, on the one hand,
is an attempt to alter knowledge structures, or on the other, an
attempt to improve drafting techniques that implement certain
knowledge structures. It is submitted that Allen views normalized
drafting as modifying knowledge structures, and that he regards it as
the major paradigm in present research in legislative drafting. In the
author's view the issue is not beyond argument; and the answer
relies, in part, upon the definition of normalized drafting. It may be
that implementation issues rather than changes to knowledge
structure are being studied when examining normalized drafting
techniques. In any event, whenever researchers are modifying a
variable regarded as an attribute of normalized drafting, it is essential
for them to consider if they are altering knowledge structures. If
this is, in fact, the case, it is necessary for legislative drafters, the
subjects of the experiment, to be properly trained in the knowledge
structure if unequivocal results are to be obtained.5 4
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper an analysis of normalized drafting theory from
an empirical viewpoint has been undertaken. Four major arguments
have been advanced: first, that the theory describing the impact of
normalized drafting on the legislative process is in an embryonic
stage of development and needs further description; secondly, that
the absence of a comprehensive theory has prevented the generation
of rigourous hypotheses that enable both understanding and
prediction of the drafting task to be obtained; thirdly, that until the
theory has been better articulated it is not possible to develop
53 See for example, Einhorn, Kleinmuntz, & Kleinmuntz, "Linear Regression and Process
Tracing Models of Judgment" (1979) 86 Psy. Rev. 465.
54 See further, L.E. Allen & C.R. Engholm, supra, note 4 at 470, where the authors
gave to the subjects of their experiments an explanatory memorandum on normalized drafting
techniques "intended to familiarize the subjects with provisions written in normalized form and
to provide some practice in working with such provisions."
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strategic hypotheses and, therefore, perform parsimonious empirical
research; and finally, that the lack of empirical work reflects the
poor condition of the underlying theory.
The ideas underlying the normalized drafting approach
appear compelling. Published empirical evidence, however, is almost
nonexistent. Unfortunately, it will not be until the underlying theory
is properly developed that empirical verification will be possible, and
further progress achieved.
